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Abstract
In this paper, we explore the impact of current household repayment ca-
pacity on mortgage default using household-level panel data over the period
2004-2017 for Ireland. We measure repayment capacity as changes in the level
of the current debt-service to income ratio to capture a direct channel for
aﬀordability shocks. We model the relationship between repayment capacity
and default using a discrete time logit survival model of default ﬂows. We test
for a non-linear relationship to explore whether negative and positive shocks
have asymmetric eﬀects and whether shocks depend on household absorptive
capacity. We also test the diﬀering impacts of repayment shocks in crisis and
non-crisis times and whether any diﬀerences are explained by negative equity
or liquidity constraints. A number of ﬁndings emerge. We ﬁnd that deterio-
rations in current debt service capacity have a positive and increasing eﬀect
on default which is dependent on the level of indebtedness or absorptive ca-
pacity. We ﬁnd that the relationship between deteriorations in the repayment
capacity and default are worsened in crisis times and we show that this is due
to the presence of negative equity and liquidity constraints in these periods.
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1 Introduction
Assessing the drivers of mortgage default has long been of interest to both academics and
policy makers alike. In recent theoretical models, default is explained by the inﬂuence of
two channels: a) house price shocks which move the household into negative equity and b)
shocks to their ability to maintain repayments through the labour market or through rises
in the cost of ﬁnance (Campbell and Cocco, 2015; Aron and Muellbauer, 2016). These
channels are predicted to interact through a double trigger where households suﬀering
from a combination of both negative equity and aﬀordability shocks are more likely to
default (Foote et al., 2008).
Empirically this research has increased in saliency in recent years due to the link be-
tween mortgage delinquency and the global ﬁnancial crisis, and the increasing importance
being placed on ﬁnancial stability of both households and mortgage banks more broadly
(Duca et al., 2010; Mayer et al., 2009). The research has mainly focused on determining the
relative importance of equity shocks which change the value of the property relative to the
outstanding debt, and shocks to loan aﬀordability from adverse labour market outcomes
such as job loss or reductions in take home pay (Gerardi et al., 2008; Elul et al., 2010;
Haughwout et al., 2008; Fuster and Willen, 2017; Kelly and O'Malley, 2016; Lydon and
McCarthy, 2013; Connor and Flavin, 2015).
In the existing research, Mocetti and Viviano (2017) note there has been a dispropor-
tionate focus on the housing equity channel. One explanation for this is that a large number
of these papers are based on the US, where the institutional setting is more favourable to
strategic default, due to the non-recourse legislation present in certain states. This is
compared to the European market where mortgage debt is not discharged with the sale of
the property, and therefore the consequences of default are more severe in terms of future
access to the credit market.
A second explanation is the challenge from a data perspective in obtaining a suitable
measure for both equity and aﬀordability at the micro level. While most studies in the
existing literature have loan level measures of the current loan-to-value ratio, few studies
have up-to-date information on household income in order to properly account for aﬀord-
ability shocks. Indeed, the greater focus on the housing equity channel potentially arises
due to the use of bank loan level data which do not contain borrower characteristics, or
at best, only contain limited information from the time of loan origination. Consequently
these datasets lack crucial information on current income and labour market status. This
has led to the frequent use of aggregate, regional level unemployment rates as an approxi-
mation for individual level aﬀordability shocks. Gyourko and Tracy (2014) show that using
local level unemployment rates as a proxy for unobserved household level employment sta-
tus leads to severe attenuation bias and underestimates the true eﬀect of unemployment
on default by as much as a factor of 100.
The lack of adequate measures of current repayment capacity or aﬀordability shocks in
most datasets means that to date relatively few studies have used data on current income
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to test aﬀordability channels, with Gerardi et al. (2017), Mocetti and Viviano (2017)
and Slaymaker et al. (2019) notable exceptions. This lack of current income information
with which to measure directly the repayment capacity of the household, in particular
for a sample that spans a broad period of tranquil and turbulent economic times, has
left a number of questions unanswered in the literature: does the relationship between
repayment capacity and default diﬀer depending on the magnitude of any shock or the
level of indebtedness of the household? Does the relationship between repayment capacity
and default vary over time depending in broader economic conditions for example in crisis
and non-crisis periods? Can any diﬀerences be explained by the presence of negative equity
(to drive the double trigger) or liquidity constraints?
To address these gaps in the literature, this paper examines the impact of repayment
capacity on mortgage default using Irish household survey data over the period 2004-2017,
a period which bookends a systemic ﬁnancial crisis with periods of strong economic growth.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we build on the work by Slaymaker et al.
(2019) to explore the link between mortgage repayment capacity and default by testing the
direct relationship between changes in the debt-service ratio and ﬂows into default. Using
the change in the current debt service ratio provides us with a direct measure of aﬀordability
shocks that come from both the labour market as well as interest rate changes and provides
a direct measure of repayment capacity. These data allow us to deploy a methodology that
addresses two biases common in studies on mortgage default; the omitted variables relating
to current household-level circumstances and the measurement error from using aggregate
employment information. We also have household level information on the current loan-
to-value ratio and a range of other household controls.
Second, we test whether changes in the repayment capacity are non-linear (depending
on the magnitude of the shock) and have a diﬀerent impact on mortgage default depending
on the level of household absorptive capacity (or indebtedness measured by the level of the
DSR in period t-1).
Third, and a particular novelty of our paper, we then exploit the length of time our
data covers to explore whether the impact of changes in the debt service ratio on default
diﬀers in periods of systemic crisis compared to times of relative macroeconomic stability.
The reach of our samples across turbulent and stable periods allows us to split our sample
and test the impact of shocks to the debt service ratio in both periods. Diﬀerences could
be expected in theory if, for example, the level of negative equity or liquidity constraints
diﬀers in these contexts. We examine both of these channels in terms of how aﬀordability
shocks may be exacerbated by negative equity or liquidity constraints. To our knowledge,
this has not been tested to date in the literature.
A number of recent papers using survey or administrative data to link mortgage per-
formance to current income are close to our work. Mocetti and Viviano (2017) use ad-
ministrative data on income and credit registry data for Italy to explore the impact of
income shocks on mortgage delinquencies in a panel setting. They ﬁnd a large eﬀect of
income shocks on default. However, they do not explicitly link the debt service ratio to
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default which means they are omitting as an inﬂuence any changes that are relating to the
repayment through interest rate adjustments. They also do not take into account the level
of indebtedness of the households which would capture how much spare capacity each has
to absorb shocks.
Aller and Grant (2018) and McCarthy (2014) also use panel and cross sectional survey
data respectively containing current income to explain mortgage defaults. We build on
these papers by explicitly linking the household's current debt service ratio to transitions
into default, ensuring that we take account of potential changes to both incomes and
mortgage instalments, as well as additional employment and health information for all
household members. These studies don't explicitly link the current debt-service ratio to
default, rather, they use income and employment data separately. The latter is also reliant
on cross-sectional data.
In one recent study which does link the current repayment capacity through the DSR
to default, Gerardi et al. (2017) use the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data,
containing current income information, to quantify the relative importance of negative
equity versus aﬀordability concerns for the US. They ﬁnd evidence that changes in the
ability to pay, for example due to job loss, have large eﬀects on the probability of default.
The authors also ﬁnd evidence of strategic default, estimating that more than one third
of households who did default could have continued to pay their monthly mortgage instal-
ments without needing to reduce their consumption. One limitation of their dataset is its
biannual frequency which prevents modelling default using a survival approach. They also
do not look at non-linear eﬀects and test for diﬀerences in periods of systemic crises and
economic tranquillity, which is also a contribution of our paper relative to Aller and Grant
(2018), Mocetti and Viviano (2017), Slaymaker et al. (2019) and McCarthy (2014).
A number of ﬁndings emerge. We ﬁnd both the level of, and shocks to, the current
debt service ratio to be key determinants of households transitioning into mortgage loan
delinquency. Changes in the debt service ratio appear to have the largest eﬀect highlighting
the saliency of the aﬀordability shocks channel. Examining the importance of a household's
capacity to absorb shocks, we show that the direction of the aﬀordability shock (positive
or negative) matters and is dependent on the level of indebtedness. A deterioration in the
debt service ratio increases the likelihood of delinquency regardless of the level of debt,
but with double the magnitude of eﬀect for highly indebted households.
With regards to how the relationship between changes in the debt servicing capacity
and default diﬀers over time, we show that the sensitivity of default to a one per cent rise
in the DSR is greater during periods of systemic crisis relative to more macroeconomically
stable, non-crisis times. Further examination of the channels driving variation in this
relationship over time reveals that both negative equity and liquidity constraints help to
explain the diﬀering eﬀects during crisis and non-crisis periods. More speciﬁcally, two
points are important to highlight. First, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on the change in
the debt service ratio (for those households experiencing an increase in the DSR) was much
higher for those households in negative equity. This ﬁnding supports the double trigger
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hypothesis, as well as documenting the importance of repayment capacity in driving default.
Second, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient was also considerably higher for those households
who faced tighter liquidity in crisis periods, indicated by households who were previously
unable to save regularly. This ﬁnding holds for both households with and without negative
equity which demonstrates a separate liquidity channel during crisis periods.
These ﬁndings are important as they highlight how the eﬀects of repayment capacity
shocks vary according to the broader economic situation, the degree of housing equity
and household liquidity. These ﬁndings should be taken into account by policymakers in
designing macroprudential policy measures as well as those designing eﬀective interven-
tions during crises to ameliorate heightened loan default (such as the various mortgage
modiﬁcation programmes in the US and Europe).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the data and
empirical model used in the analysis. Section 3 presents the baseline empirical results,
while Section 4 explores how the relationship between the debt service ratio and default
diﬀers during periods of systemic crisis. Section 5 presents some robustness checks and
Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and Empirical Model
2.1 Data and Summary Statistics
In this section we present the data used in the analysis. The data come from the 2004-2017
Irish waves of the EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) which is coordi-
nated by Eurostat and undertaken by the national statistical agencies. SILC is a household
panel survey containing information on topics ranging from housing to poverty, depriva-
tion and social exclusion, in addition to standard socio-demographic characteristics and
current income data. Critically for our purposes, the Irish SILC contains information for
each household on home ownership, current dwelling value, originating mortgage condi-
tions (loan size and term), outstanding loan balance, current interest rate type, monthly
mortgage instalments and whether a household is in default on their mortgage payments.
A common issue with the use of survey data in this ﬁeld is that surveys typically do not
collect data on mortgage default on a regular basis (Mocetti and Viviano, 2017). Using
Irish SILC data overcomes this issue; a measure of missed mortgage payments is captured
in the dataset in a four year rotating panel structure (households are surveyed annually
for a maximum of four years).
One of the major challenges in the existing literature, from a data perspective, is
obtaining a suitable measure of the aﬀordability, or ability to pay channel at the household
level (Gerardi et al., 2017). The majority of existing studies use administrative loan-level
data, which either do not contain borrower characteristics, or at best, only contain limited
information from the time of loan origination. Consequently, few studies have up-to-date
information on household income and the employment status of household members, in
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addition to mortgage loan information, in order to properly account for repayment capacity
shocks. Researchers therefore typically use aggregate regional measures of unemployment
as a proxy for household level income shocks (Elul et al., 2010; Kelly and O'Malley, 2016;
Bhutta et al., 2017). However, Gyourko and Tracy (2014) show that using local level
unemployment rates as a proxy for unobserved household level income and employment
shocks leads to severe attenuation bias and underestimates the true eﬀect of unemployment
on default.
As discussed in Slaymaker et al. (2019), one of the main motivations for using SILC
data to examine the determinants of mortgage default is that it enables us to combine
information on mortgage payment default with timely data on the household's economic
status. This ensures that two biases common in existing studies are avoided; the omitted
variable bias relating to the lack of current household income and the measurement error
from using aggregate employment information. The importance of using timely data is
underlined by the fact that economic conditions can deteriorate quickly, as was the case in
Ireland where the unemployment rate increased sharply from just over 5 per cent in early
2008 to nearly 16 per cent by mid 2010. We are able to exploit up-to-date information
on current net household income and monthly mortgage payments to directly link both
changes in repayment capacity (through reductions in income or increased payments) as
well as the level of indebtedness to loan delinquency. Moreover, in addition to the household
questionnaire, all household members also complete an individual level survey component
containing responses to key socio-economic factors such as employment and health status;
potential trigger events for default. Utilising these individual level responses allows us
to obtain a more accurate picture of the employment and health situations of the entire
household, rather than simply relying on information for the individual household member
who completed the household questionnaire. Speciﬁcally, we observe whether the number
of unemployed adults in the household has risen in the previous year and whether one or
more household members suﬀered a chronic health shock in the last 12 months.
In addition to enabling us to better measure the repayment capacity channel, with
regards to the equity channel, another advantage of using SILC is that it contains in-
formation on the current dwelling value, which enables us to calculate a current loan to
value ratio. Typically in the existing literature this is done by updating the house price at
origination using the growth in house prices in a local area (Elul et al., 2010).
Several potential concerns remain over the use of survey data to examine the determi-
nants of mortgage loan delinquency. Mocetti and Viviano (2017) argue that sample sizes
are typically small due to mortgage delinquency being a low probability event, casting
doubt over the reliability of empirical estimates. In addition, they express sample selection
concerns, arguing that certain households may be less willing to answer survey questions
and that this is likely correlated with them having repayment diﬃculties, leading to under-
representation of mortgage default in surveys. In previous work using SILC Slaymaker et
al. (2019) have shown that for the period 2009-20161, there is a 0.88 correlation between
1Central Bank of Ireland loan level data are only available from 2009 onwards.
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the percentage of principal dwelling home (PDH) loans in default of any length in the
oﬃcial Central Bank of Ireland mortgage arrears statistics and the percentage of house-
holds in mortgage default in SILC (see Figure 2 Slaymaker et al. (2019)). Furthermore,
Slaymaker et al. (2019) build a household stress testing model which predicts a 2.7% rate
of transitions into mortgage default in 2016. Using Central Bank of Ireland loan-level data,
McCann (2017) shows that the actual six monthly ﬂow was approximately 1.5%, indicating
that the model based on these SILC data is a very close ﬁt with the actual observed loan-
level data. We therefore contend that SILC is a suitable dataset with which to undertake
analysis of the determinants of mortgage default.
Figure 1: Debt Service Ratio and Income Distributions by Default Status
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In Figure 1a we plot the distributions of the current debt service ratio (DSR), the ratio
of monthly mortgage payment to net monthly income, for households in and not in mort-
gage default respectively. The DSR distribution for households in default is clearly shifted
to the right indicating a higher proportion of these households pay a greater proportion
of their income to service their mortgage payments relative to households who are not in
default. Similarly, Figure 1b shows that households in default are more highly concen-
trated towards the lower end of the income distribution compared to those not in default.
Both of these charts highlight the correlation between repayment capacity constraints and
mortgage default that we will test empirically in Section 3.
Our ﬁnal sample consists of all mortgaged households who are surveyed in at least
two consecutive years and have full information on mortgage default, monthly mortgage
instalments, outstanding mortgage balance, current dwelling value and disposable income.
For households in mortgage default, we restrict the sample to contain households only in
the year they transition into default, i.e. we remove those who had already defaulted in
a previous survey year. We present descriptive statistics for our ﬁnal sample in Table 1.
3.5 per cent of the ﬁnal sample transitioned into mortgage default. In terms of mortgage
loan characteristics, from Table 1 we see that households who transitioned into default
in our sample had similar monthly mortgage instalments to those not in default, but
that their disposable income levels were e12,000 lower than households not in default.
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Table 1: Decsriptive Statistics by Default Status
(1) (2)
No Arrears Arrears
Original Loan (e) 156418.70 162690.10
Outstanding Principal (e) 131523.80 137583.20
Monthly Payment (e) 853.62 855.58
Mortgage Term (Years) 25 26
Debt Service Ratio 0.18 0.22
Change in DSR -0.003 0.015
Current Loan to Value Ratio 0.51 0.66
Negative Equity 0.12 0.25
Real Disposable Income (e) 62680.82 50300.88
Rise in no. Unemployed in HH 0.04 0.25
HH member health shock 0.09 0.20
No. Obs 4178 152
Consequently, they also had higher debt service ratios, paying on average 22 per cent of
their income compared to only 18 per cent for households not in default. Interestingly,
while households not in default on average saw a slight fall in their debt service ratio,
those who transitioned into default saw a rise. In addition, approximately one quarter of
households who transitioned into default saw a rise in the number of unemployed household
members, while one ﬁfth contained a household member who suﬀered a major health shock
in the preceding year. We will test these channels empirically in Section 2.2.
2.2 Empirical Model
Our empirical approach uses a standard survival model of transitions into default. Let
Defaultit =
1 Default∗it ≥ 0;0 otherwise
where Default∗it represents the underlying latent propensity of falling into default and
Defaultit is the observed indicator variable for whether household i falls into default in year
t2. Our model is estimated using a discrete time logit survival speciﬁcation which models
the probability that a household transitions into delinquency as a function of aﬀordability
and equity shocks, as well as the underlying socio-economic characteristics of the borrower:
2In SILC respondents are asked whether In the last 12 months, did it happen that the house-
hold was unable to make a mortgage repayment for the main dwelling on time, due to ﬁnancial
diﬃculties?. Our deﬁnition of default therefore diﬀers from the commonly used Basel III 90 days
past due deﬁnition.
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Pr(Defaultit = 1) = f(∆DSRit, DSRit−1, lnYit−1,∆Sit, CLTVit−1,∆CLTVit,Xit, φi, γt) (1)
Our principal loan repayment capacity measure is the DSR, the proportion of current
net monthly income spent on mortgage repayments. We include both the lagged level
(DSRit−1) and the change in the debt service ratio (∆DSRit) in our speciﬁcation to
account for both the level of repayment capacity, as well as any aﬀordability shocks. The
inclusion of lagged net income, lnYit−1 , in addition to the debt service ratio enables us to
capture the impacts of diﬀering DSR levels and DSR shocks for a given income level.
∆Sit is a vector of household variables that could be considered potential trigger events
for loan delinquency, speciﬁcally whether the household has suﬀered either an employment
or a health shock during the previous year. Exploiting the individual survey component
of the SILC data, we create two indicator variables for whether the number of household
members in unemployment has risen and if one or more household members suﬀered a
chronic health shock in the last year. Including these indicator variables ensures that
borrowers who faced a catastrophic event which may have triggered mortgage delinquency
are separately controlled for, over and above the repayment capacity challenges captured
by the debt service ratio. The DSR therefore picks up the eﬀects of smaller falls in income
which may be due to wage cuts or a reduction in working hours, as well as an increase in
mortgage payments, that are not necessarily caused by these trigger events.
To control for the housing equity channel, we include both the lagged level (CLTVit−1)
and the change in the household's current loan-to-value ratio (∆CLTVit). Xit is a vector
of household borrower characteristics which include the age, education level and marital
status of the household head, as well as the household composition. We also include NUTS3
region, φi, and year, γt ﬁxed eﬀects to control for both regional macroeconomic variation
and business cycle ﬂuctuations.
As discussed in Kelly et al. (2015), the choice of the functional form for time is an
important consideration in discrete time survival models. The latent exposure to default
risk varies across both households and time. To account for this, we follow Kelly et al.
(2015) in modelling the functional form for time as a polynomial of loan vintage, years
since loan origination. We append this measure to the model shown in equation 1.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Baseline Results
In Table 2 we present the results from estimating the discrete time survival model of
transitions into mortgage default outlined in Section 2.2. We report average marginal
eﬀects from logit estimations with standard errors in parentheses. All speciﬁcations include
loan vintage, year and NUTS3 region dummy variables. In Column 1 we ﬁrst focus purely
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Table 2: Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Household Characteristics
Age
36-50 -0.0241∗∗ -0.0205∗ -0.0206∗∗ -0.0195∗ -0.0199∗
(0.0108) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0105)
>50 -0.00783 -0.00172 -0.00191 -0.00296 -0.00353
(0.0168) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0170) (0.0171)
Marital Status
Single 0.0138 0.0121 0.0126 0.0135 0.0150
(0.0154) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0154) (0.0156)
Widowed/Separated/Divorced -0.000868 -0.000873 -0.000204 -0.000412 0.00100
(0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0137) (0.0133) (0.0137)
Secondary 0.00369 0.00464 0.00408 0.00427 0.00301
(0.0208) (0.0205) (0.0208) (0.0200) (0.0204)
Tertiary -0.00793 -0.00687 -0.00765 -0.00640 -0.00779
(0.0214) (0.0212) (0.0214) (0.0206) (0.0210)
Household Composition
1 adult, 1+ children 0.0371 0.0358 0.0344 0.0357 0.0326
(0.0254) (0.0249) (0.0246) (0.0235) (0.0220)
2+ adults, no children 0.0129 0.0123 0.0127 0.0158∗ 0.0173∗∗
(0.00850) (0.00866) (0.00865) (0.00830) (0.00827)
2+ adults, 1+ children 0.0326∗∗∗ 0.0315∗∗∗ 0.0316∗∗∗ 0.0356∗∗∗ 0.0364∗∗∗
(0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0108) (0.0107)
Household Shocks
HH member health shock 0.0290∗∗∗ 0.0289∗∗∗ 0.0293∗∗∗ 0.0266∗∗∗ 0.0273∗∗∗
(0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.00935) (0.00939)
Rise in no. Unemployed in HH 0.0652∗∗∗ 0.0646∗∗∗ 0.0648∗∗∗ 0.0615∗∗∗ 0.0611∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0119) (0.0120)
L.Log Real HH Income -0.0133 -0.0139 -0.0104 -0.0194∗∗ -0.0126
(0.00856) (0.00883) (0.00962) (0.00896) (0.00937)
LTV Channel
L.CLTV 0.0107 0.00880 0.0123 0.00815
(0.00925) (0.00945) (0.00888) (0.00932)
∆CLTV 0.00333 0.00220 0.00302 0.000167
(0.0117) (0.0121) (0.0115) (0.0122)
Aﬀordability Channel
L.DSR 0.0289 0.0669
(0.0465) (0.0452)
∆DSR 0.110∗ 0.127∗∗
(0.0656) (0.0618)
Loan Vintage Y Y Y Y Y
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y
NUTS 3 Region Dummies Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 4,330 4,330 4,330 4,330 4,330
Loan vintage is deﬁned as years since mortgage origination. Standard errors reported in parentheses and signiﬁcance
level displayed as ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01..
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on borrower characteristics. Households in the middle age group of 36-50 years of age are
less likely to default relative to younger households. Regarding household composition,
households containing a couple and at least one child are more likely to default relative
to the base group of single adult households. Unsurprisingly, higher disposable income
levels are associated with a lower likelihood of falling into loan delinquency. Finally, we
observe that both a rise in the number of unemployed adults in the household and a
household member having suﬀered a chronic health shock in the previous 12 months are
statistically signiﬁcant determinants of a household transitioning into default. These results
are consistent with previous ﬁndings by Duygan-Bump and Grant (2009).
In Column 2, in order to account for the housing equity channel, we include both a one
period lag of the current-loan-to-value ratio, CLTV, and ∆CLTV; neither are statistically
signiﬁcant. While it may appear surprising that we do not ﬁnd a direct eﬀect of the equity
channel, it must be remembered that equity shocks normally materialise into default when
borrowers pass the negative equity threshold. Given the sample period we include, which
covers a large number of years with rising house prices and high housing equity, it is not
unsurprising that the average eﬀect of LTV is insigniﬁcant. We return to the issue of
negative equity thresholds later in the paper.
In Columns 3-5 we add our key measures of household repayment capacity, the house-
hold's lagged debt service ratio (Column 3) and the change in the DSR (Column 4) sep-
arately and then together (Column 5). Including both the lagged level and the change in
the household's debt service ratio accounts for both the level of repayment capacity and
any shocks the household may face. From column 5 we see that shocks to debt servicing
capacity is an important determinant of falling into delinquency. In addition, the mag-
nitude and signiﬁcance of the impact of health and unemployment shocks on mortgage
delinquency remains unchanged. The lagged level of the debt servicing capacity is not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant in this speciﬁcation. Our evidence therefore indicates that the actual
level of the debt service to income is not a signiﬁcant driver of default, rather defaults are
driven by changes in the debt service ratio i.e. shocks to aﬀordability matter. However,
eﬀects may be evident across the distribution that are not captured by this speciﬁcation
which is at the mean. We will examine this further in the remainder of section 3.
3.2 Are the Eﬀects Non-Linear?
To pick up on our previous analysis, we now delve into possible non-linearity in the eﬀects
of the relationship between a household's repayment capacity and loan delinquency. We
might expect the impact of a shock to the debt service ratio to vary depending on the
magnitude of the shock, as households are more likely to be able to absorb a smaller
increase in their debt service ratio. In Figure 1a we show that the DSR distribution for
those households in default was shifted to the right of those not in default, meaning that
households in default typically pay a larger fraction of their income on their mortgage
instalments. It therefore seems likely that the severity of any shock may be non-linear, i.e.
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a DSR shock may have a greater impact on default as it becomes more severe.
Figure 2: The Impact of Shocks to the Debt Service Ratio on Mortgage Default
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∆DSR
In Table 2 we established that there is a positive relationship between ∆DSR and
the likelihood that a household falls into delinquency. In order to explore potential non-
linearities in the relationship between repayment capacity and mortgage default we begin
by simply adding ∆DSR2 to the baseline model. In Figure 2 we present the marginal eﬀects
of ∆DSR on default at discrete values of the repayment capacity shock, ∆DSR from this
speciﬁcation.
The estimated coeﬃcients presented in Figure 2 suggest that larger deteriorations
(∆DSR>0) in a household's repayment capacity have a greater eﬀect on the likelihood
of that household falling into default. However, it must be noted that the eﬀects of larger
DSR deteriorations are not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the eﬀects of smaller de-
teriorations. The large error bars likely indicate that this is due to relatively small sample
sizes for the extreme shocks. What is evident from Figure 2 is that there is a asymmetry in
the eﬀect of ∆DSR on falling into default. A deterioration, or increase in ∆DSR leads to a
statistically signiﬁcant increase in households falling into default, whereas an improvement
in the DSR, from a positive income shock for example, has no impact on the likelihood
that a household transitions into delinquency.
3.3 Does the Level of Indebtedness Matter?
In Figure 2 we found no eﬀect of an improvement in the DSR, ∆DSR<0, on the likelihood
that a household falls into delinquency, but that a worsening in the DSR, ∆DSR>0, is
associated with an increased likelihood of falling into default. We next examine whether
shocks of the same magnitude may have diﬀering eﬀects depending on the households'
ability to absorb such a shock or the level of the starting DSR. Recall for the ﬁrst spec-
iﬁcations, we did not ﬁnd any impact of the level of the DSR. However, it may be the
11
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case that the level of indebtedness interacts with the shock to amplify the eﬀects i.e. we
might expect that households with a lower initial DSR may be better able to absorb a
shock of the same magnitude than a household already paying a higher proportion of their
income on their mortgage instalments. For instance, a household facing an increase in
their mortgage repayments from 15 to 20 per cent of net income may be able to continue
to make their repayments, whereas a similar 5 percentage point increase from 30 to 35 per
cent may leave a household unable to make these repayments.
To examine this we separate households according to the value of their initial DSR,
classifying a household as lowly indebted if they pay less than 25 per cent of their income
on mortgage payments and highly indebted if they pay 25 per cent or more of their income
on monthly instalments. The choice of a 25 per cent threshold is somewhat arbitrary, but
it classiﬁes approximately 25 per cent of our sample as highly indebted.
In Table 3 we present the marginal eﬀects of a one per cent fall, ∆DSR<0, and a one per
cent rise, ∆DSR>0 for both low and high initial DSR levels. As in Figure 2, a deterioration
in the DSR, ∆DSR>0, is associated with an increased likelihood of falling into default for
both households with a low and high initial DSR. However, the magnitude of the eﬀect is
double for those households with a high DSR, indicating that these households have less
capacity to absorb a shock to their repayment burden. Regarding an improvement in the
DSR, ∆DSR<0, is associated with a negative coeﬃcient, indicating a fall in the likelihood
of falling into default, although these coeﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 3: The Impact of ∆DSR on Default by Absorptive Capacity
(1)
∆ DSR<0, low DSR -0.151
(0.121)
∆ DSR<0, high DSR -0.100
(0.095)
∆ DSR>0, low DSR 0.158∗∗∗
(0.0388)
∆ DSR>0, high DSR 0.332∗∗
(0.154)
Observations 4,330
Marginal eﬀects of a one per cent rise and decrease in ∆DSR on default for high and low initial levels of DSR.
High DSR>0.25; low DSR<0.25. Standard errors reported in parentheses and signiﬁcance level displayed as ∗ p <
0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
One important caveat to note here is that we only consider the debt service ratio
related to the mortgage loan. SILC does not contain any information about the monetary
value of any other loan commitments the household may have. SILC does however contain
binary indicators for whether a household has consumer loans and whether they have fallen
into default on their repayments, providing an indication of broader ﬁnancial distress. We
address this as a robustness check in Section 5.
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4 Does the Relationship Between Repayment Ca-
pacity and Default Change During a Systemic
Crisis?
Much of the recent literature examining the determinants of mortgage default centres
around the time of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, aided by the increasing availability of detailed
loan-level data. These papers provide invaluable insights into the key factors which drive
mortgage loan delinquencies during a systemic crisis. One question which naturally arises
is whether the drivers of loan delinquency change over time. Households who fall into
default during periods of relative macroeconomic stability may be those who suﬀer so called
trigger events such as ill health, relationship breakdowns and unemployment. However, in a
systemic crisis, labour market shocks, both in terms of unemployment and income cuts for
those who remain employed, may also permeate to groups in the economy that would not
be aﬀected in normal times. In addition, the prevalence of negative equity may exacerbate
the impact of labour market shocks; the so called double trigger model of mortgage default.
Previous descriptive work by Fahy et al. (2018) using Irish SILC data provides suggestive
evidence that the relative importance of the various channels of default may vary over
time. They show that during pre-crisis years households that suﬀered health, employment
and marital shocks saw higher mortgage default rates3, but that during the systemic crisis
typically lower risk groups such as the employed and healthy saw the largest increases in
incidence of default.
Our speciﬁc focus in this paper is on how the relationship between our key measure
of repayment capacity, the debt service ratio, and mortgage default changes during a
systemic crisis period relative to more macroeconomically stable periods. The double
trigger theory of default suggests that the presence of negative equity during a systemic
crisis should exacerbate aﬀordability shocks, leading the DSR to have a greater impact on
default during crisis times, relative to non-crisis periods when house prices are rising. To
think further about why this may be the case, it is useful to consider the simple two period
theoretical model of mortgage default introduced by Foote et al. (2008) which provides a
theoretical rationale for why the double trigger of negative equity and aﬀordability shocks
leads households to default on their mortgage. Traditional frictionless models of default
such as in Kau et al. (1994) posit that borrowers should continue to stay current on
their mortgage repayments as long as the present value of the house is greater than the
mortgage owing i.e. taking expected future house price appreciation into consideration
in their default decision. These models operate under the assumption that all borrowers
are free to borrow at the same price. Foote et al. (2008) note that empirically borrower-
speciﬁc aﬀordability shocks such as unemployment also play a role in the default decision.
They therefore introduce heterogeneity across borrowers with respect to the cost of funds
3This work refers to the stock of households in mortgage default at a point in time rather than
households who transition into default during a particular period.
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into their model in order to capture the diﬀering levels of credit constraints faced. They
show that the value placed on both the house and the mortgage varies according to each
household due to this heterogeneity in the price of credit. Consequently, a household that
is credit constrained will have a high discount rate, where this present bias means they
place a lower weight on the potential for future house price appreciation, thus increasing
the likelihood of default.
Linking this back to the relationship between the DSR and default, we contend that
households are more likely to be liquidity constrained during crisis periods and therefore
repayment capacity shocks are likely to have a greater impact on default during a systemic
crisis. Furthermore, our ﬁndings in Table 3 suggest that when leverage is high, the eﬀects
of shocks to the debt service ratio have a greater impact on the likelihood of default.
Therefore, in a crash following a credit boom, we may expect to ﬁnd a diﬀerent pass
through of shocks to default relative to more stable economic times.
This provides a number of simple testable hypotheses that can be linked back to our
empirical model. These can be summarised as follows:
H1: β∆DSR−Crisis > β∆DSR−Non−Crisis
H2: β∆DSR−NegativeEquity > β∆DSR−PositiveEquity
H3: β∆DSR−LiquidityConstrained > β∆DSR−Unconstrained
where β∆DSR is the coeﬃcient estimated in our model for the change in the debt service
ratio. The groups indicated after the coeﬃcient relate to estimating the model for diﬀerent
sub-samples or groups of households. We test each of these hypotheses in the subsections
below.
Figure 3: Percentage of Mortgaged Households:
(a) in Negative Equity
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Figure 3 provides a simple descriptive picture of two of the potential explanations
for why we may expect the relationship between the DSR and default to diﬀer during
a systemic crisis: negative equity and liquidity. From Figure 3a we observe the scale of
14
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negative equity faced by Irish mortgage holders during the ﬁnancial crisis, rising rapidly
from and peaking at more than 30 per cent of mortgaged households in 2013. Figure 3b
shows that between 2008 and 2011 there was a 20 percentage point fall in the share of
households able to save regularly among the households in our sample. In the absence
of wealth data in SILC, we use this measure as a proxy for liquidity constraints. In the
remainder of this section we formally test how the relationship between the debt service
ratio and mortgage delinquency diﬀers during crisis and non-crisis periods and attempt to
investigate the channels through which this occurs.
4.1 Testing Across Crisis and Non-Crisis Periods
We begin by simply splitting the sample between crisis and non-crisis periods. We deﬁne
the systemic crisis period as 2009-2013, with data from all remaining years classed as non-
crisis. Although large numbers of households remained in longer-term mortgage default
in Ireland in 2014, we classify this as a non-crisis period because our model examines the
determinants of ﬁrst time transitions into default and house prices were rising in 2014 with
falling unemployment and increases in incomes. We present the results from these split
sample regressions in Table 4. During the crisis period, ∆DSR has a positive, statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the ﬂow of households falling into default, but in non-crisis times this
coeﬃcient is much smaller in magnitude and no longer statistically signiﬁcant. This is
perhaps unsurprising in that during non-crisis times we also see that health shocks and
an increase in the number of unemployed household members appear to be the major
determinants of households falling into default. These tend to be relatively uncommon
events and are typically associated with a substantial loss of income rather than a smaller
fall in incomes, or a reduction in hours that are more widespread during a systemic crisis
and likely to be picked up by the change in the DSR. In contrast to the baseline results
in Table 2, from column 1 of Table 4 we see that during the crisis period, the level of the
debt service ratio is associated with a statistically signiﬁcant increase in default ﬂows.
One concern that arises with the ﬁndings presented in Table 4 is whether it is simply
the case that there are insuﬃcient cases of households transitioning into default outside of
the crisis period, or similarly, is there too little variation in ∆DSR, to statistically identify
an eﬀect on mortgage delinquency. With regards to the incidence of default, in Table 10
in the Appendix we show that 2.3 per cent of the sample transitioned into delinquency
during non-crisis years relative to 6.2 per cent during the crisis. While, as expected this
represents a smaller proportion of that sample, the statistical signiﬁcance associated with
aﬀordability trigger events of unemployment and health shocks in Table 4, suggests that
there are not insuﬃcient cases of default to estimate the model separately on the respective
samples.
In Figure 4 we present the distribution of ∆DSR for both crisis and non-crisis years.
The distributions of debt service ratio shocks are in fact fairly similar during both periods,
with a median ∆DSR close to 0 and households facing a range of both positive and negative
15
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Table 4: Determinants of Mortgage Default in Crisis versus Non-Crisis Periods
(1) (2)
Crisis Non-Crisis
HH member health shock 0.0247 0.0226∗∗∗
(0.0203) (0.00767)
Rise in no. Unemployed in HH 0.0966∗∗∗ 0.0413∗∗∗
(0.0247) (0.0108)
L.Log Real HH Income -0.00112 -0.0197∗∗
(0.0205) (0.00829)
L.CLTV 0.0270 -0.00343
(0.0221) (0.00917)
∆CLTV 0.00684 -0.0127
(0.0251) (0.0122)
L.DSR 0.286∗∗∗ -0.0467
(0.0980) (0.0340)
∆DSR 0.254∗∗ 0.0485
(0.103) (0.0590)
Observations 1,389 2,941
Regressions reported are marginal eﬀects as in the baseline model from the 5th column of Table 2 split out by crisis
and non-crisis period sub-samples. Crisis period covers 2009-2013. Standard errors reported in parentheses and
signiﬁcance level displayed as ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
aﬀordability shocks. The standard deviation is higher during the crisis years showing more
variability in debt service ratio shocks, with both larger increases and falls relative to non-
crisis times. Regarding negative aﬀordability shocks, or rather a decrease in the proportion
of income spent on mortgage repayments, this is perhaps unsurprising. During non-crisis
periods where incomes are typically rising, this rise in income will lower the debt service
ratio. On the other hand, during the crisis those who maintained their income may have
seen interest rate cuts, leading to a reduction in their debt service ratio. This is a pertinent
point in the Irish context given the high proportion of mortgage holders on variable rate
contracts (in particular tracker borrowers whose mortgage type had an automatic pass
through of the policy rate to arrears) and therefore aﬀected by changes in interest rates
(Fahy et al., 2019). In particular, Byrne et al. (2017) ﬁnd that the pass through of monetary
policy rate changes to borrowers in Ireland following the crisis substantially lowered default
rates for borrowers with tracker mortgages (these made up nearly 50 per cent of outstanding
mortgages during this period).
What is also clear from Figure 4, and somewhat surprising, is that it is not the case
that households only suﬀered a deterioration in their debt servicing capacity during the
crisis years. This implies that the diﬀering relationship between ∆DSR and mortgage
delinquency is not due to a lack of shocks to the DSR outside of crisis times, but rather
due to the broader economic circumstances combining with and exacerbating the impact
of these DSR shocks during the period of systemic crisis.
The presence of both positive and negative DSR shocks has implications for our esti-
mation. Indeed, taking a closer look at the impact of ∆DSR on the likelihood of falling into
16
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Figure 4: Distribution of ∆DSR Shocks in Crisis versus Non-Crisis Periods
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default, in Table 11 in the Appendix, using coeﬃcients from our logit estimation, we show
that the sign of the coeﬃcient on the eﬀect that ∆DSR has on default diﬀers according to
whether the change in the DSR is positive or negative. More speciﬁcally it shows that if
∆DSR<0, i.e. there is an improvement in the household's capacity to service its mortgage
payments, this is associated with a fall in the likelihood of the household falling into de-
fault. Whereas an increase in ∆DSR, or a worsening of the household's DSR is associated
with a rise in their likelihood of falling into default. This has important implications for
our analysis of the eﬀects of ∆DSR on the likelihood of falling into default during crisis
and non-crisis periods.
Consequently, in columns 1&2 of Table 5 we examine the impact that a one per cent
increase in ∆DSR has on default during both crisis and non crisis periods, conditional on
∆DSR>0. In column 1 we see that as expected, a one per cent increase in ∆DSR leads to
an increase in the likelihood of households falling into default during a crisis, with a larger
coeﬃcient than in column 1 of Table 4. In column 2 we see that when we condition ∆DSR
to be positive, even during non-crisis times, a 1 per cent increase in ∆DSR is associated
with a 0.085 percentage point increase in default ﬂow rate. Similarly in columns 3&4 we
examine the impact that a one per cent decline in ∆DSR has on default during both crisis
and non crisis periods, conditional on ∆DSR<0. We see that during non-crisis times this
improvement in a household's debt servicing capacity leads to a fall in the likelihood of
them falling into default, but that no such eﬀect is evident during the crisis period.
Table 5 clearly establishes that the sensitivity of default to a one per cent rise in
∆DSR is greater during crisis periods relative to non-crisis periods. In the following two
subsections we examine two potential explanations for these ﬁndings: a negative equity
channel and a liquidity constraints channel.
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Table 5: Testing the Sensitivity of Default to ∆DSR Shocks in Crisis versus Non-
Crisis Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆DSR>0 ∆DSR<0
Crisis Non-Crisis Crisis Non-Crisis
∆ DSR 0.359∗∗∗ 0.0850∗∗∗ -0.0158 -0.139∗∗
(0.0948) (0.0294) (0.158) (0.0556)
Observations 1389 2941 1389 2941
Marginal eﬀects of a one per cent increase and decrease in ∆DSR on default estimated on crisis and non-crisis
period sub-samples. Crisis period covers 2009-2013. Standard errors reported in parentheses and signiﬁcance level
displayed as ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
4.2 Does Negative Equity Aﬀect Aﬀordability Shocks?
The ﬁrst potential explanation for observing a stronger relationship between a one per
cent rise in ∆DSR and default during crisis times that we consider is the prevalence of
negative equity during systemic crisis periods. When a borrower with positive equity has
insuﬃcient liquid ﬁnancial resources to continue making their mortgage payments, they are
able to realise the value of the housing asset and pay oﬀ the outstanding mortgage debt.
Conversely, when a borrower with insuﬃcient resources to make their mortgage payments
also ﬁnds themselves in negative equity, the value of the asset does not cover the value
of the outstanding mortgage debt. According to the double-trigger theory of mortgage
default, it is this combination of negative equity and repayment capacity shocks that lead
borrowers to default on their mortgage repayments.
Table 6: Testing the Negative Equity Channel
(1) (2)
∆DSR>0
Neg eq. Non Neg eq.
∆ DSR 0.599∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.338) (0.0746)
Observations 182 1188
Takes columns 1&3 (crisis period only) of Table 5 and splits out by the one period lag of their negative equity status.
Speciﬁcation slightly altered by removing marital status, education and age groups and replacing with continuous
age to overcome issue of perfect predictors. Standard errors reported in parentheses and signiﬁcance level displayed
as ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
In order to examine this channel, in Table 6 we re-estimate columns 1&3 of Table 5,
this time splitting the crisis sample out by whether a household was in negative equity or
not, holding all other variables at means. We use a one period lag of negative equity status
in order to avoid simultaneity concerns. From columns 1&2 we see that the impact of a
one per cent increase in ∆DSR on default conditional on ∆DSR>0 during the crisis period
is three times as large when the household was in negative equity in the previous period
(column 1) compared to when they were not (column 2), albeit the coeﬃcient for households
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in negative equity is only statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level. We therefore ﬁnd
evidence to support the double-trigger theory of mortgage default. However, the positive,
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect for those who were not in negative equity indicates that the
increased sensitivity of default to a one per cent rise in ∆DSR during the crisis period
cannot solely explained by this housing equity channel.
It is worth noting that in our baseline ﬁndings presented in Table 2, we found no
statistically signiﬁcant impact of either the current Loan-to-Value ratio or ∆CLTV on the
likelihood of a household falling into default. This highlights the importance of examining
the various diﬀerent determinants of mortgage default in both crisis and non-crisis periods.
4.3 Do Liquidity Constraints Exacerbate Aﬀordability Shocks?
The second potential explanation for the diﬀerences in the sensitivity of mortgage default to
a shock to the debt service ratio between crisis and non-crisis periods is liquidity constraints
i.e. households having insuﬃcient ﬁnancial buﬀers to withstand shocks during crisis times.
We contend that households hit by a shock during a crisis period are likely to have
fewer liquid ﬁnancial assets for a number of reasons. First, their incomes may be falling
faster than prices, lessening the household's ability to hold or accumulate assets. Second,
borrowers are likely to face greater liquidity constraints. This is consistent with the model
put forward by Foote et al. (2008) which proposes credit constraints as an explanation for
why the dual trigger of negative equity and aﬀordability shocks leads to default. Borrowers
are likely to face greater liquidity constraints during a systemic crisis as ﬁnancially con-
strained banks reduce their lending during crisis periods, reducing the household's ability
to borrow from ﬁnancial institutions in order to oﬀset their aﬀordability challenges. Fur-
thermore, households are also likely to face non-bank lending cutbacks, such as it becoming
more diﬃcult to borrow from friends and family members as many of these households also
may be facing liquidity constraints. Thirdly, households who face unemployment shocks are
likely to take longer to re-enter the workforce during a crisis due to fewer re-employment
possibilities. Consequently they are likely to run down any savings, leaving them with
insuﬃcient buﬀers to withstand further or prolonged shocks.
Ideally in order to test this channel we would use information on household wealth,
but SILC does not contain any information on household assets, the value of savings, or
overall wealth. Instead, we therefore utilise information in the SILC survey on whether or
not households were able to regularly save some of their income prior to falling into default
on their mortgage payments. This enables us to separate our sample into those households
who were and were not regular savers. We use this as a proxy for the liquidity situation of
the household.
A priori we would expect a deterioration in the debt servicing capacity to have a
stronger impact on the likelihood of falling into mortgage default for those borrowers who
were not regular savers, as these households are likely to have fewer savings resulting in
fewer liquid assets and buﬀers to withstand shocks. Furthermore, it is likely that these
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borrowers will be the most liquidity constrained in terms of what they are able to borrow
from banks and other ﬁnancial institutions due to having fewer ﬁnancial assets. As employ-
ment shocks, falling incomes and liquidity constraints are all more common during crisis
times, we would expect to see stronger eﬀects during crisis periods. In addition, non-savers
are likely to have greater re-employment probabilities in non-crisis times enabling them
to get back into work more quickly, reducing the likelihood of them falling into default.
Conversely, we would not expect a deterioration in the debt servicing capacity of regular
savers to lead to mortgage default in either crisis or non-crisis periods. The fact that these
households are able to regularly save some of their income would suggest that they have
some ﬁnancial buﬀer against potential shocks, at least in the short term. It also seems
plausible that these households are less likely to be liquidity constrained in terms of their
ability to borrow from banks and other ﬁnancial institutions.
We separate households by the one period lag of their ability to regularly save some of
their income. We do so in order to avoid any simultaneity concerns as households who have
fallen into default are likely to have been forced to stop their regular savings. In Table 6 we
showed that DSR shocks had a greater impact on default for those households in negative
equity. We would expect that many of these households would simultaneously suﬀer from
liquidity constraints. However, here we are speciﬁcally interested in whether liquidity
constraints can help to explain why we observe, positive, statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects
of ∆DSR on mortgage delinquency for households not in negative equity. We therefore
estimate the model over the whole sample in order to hold all other variables at their
means for the whole sample. We do so in an attempt to disentangle the eﬀects of liquidity
constraints from other factors such as negative equity whose means diﬀer substantially over
the diﬀerent periods.
Table 7: Testing for Liquidity Constraints
(1) (2) (3)
Savers Non-Savers Non-Savers
Positive Equity
Non-crisis -0.153 0.0882∗∗ 0.0804∗
(0.173) (0.0310) (0.0375)
Crisis -0.340 0.570∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗
(0.280) (0.185) (0.194)
Observations 4,327 4,327 4,327
Marginal eﬀects of a one per cent increase in ∆DSR on default for savers and non-savers during crisis and non-crisis
periods. Saver status determined by one period lag of response to whether able to regularly save income. Crisis
period covers 2009-2013. Standard errors reported in parentheses and signiﬁcance level displayed as ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
In Table 7 we report the marginal eﬀects of a one per cent increase in ∆DSR for savers
and non-savers during crisis and non-crisis times respectively. From columns 1&2 of Table 7
we observe that the positive, statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of debt service ratio shocks on
mortgage delinquency are indeed completely driven by those borrowers without a prior
regular savings habit i.e. those most likely to be liquidity constrained when hit by a DSR
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shock. To further disentangle these liquidity eﬀects from potential negative equity eﬀects,
in column 3 we focus solely on those households in positive equity. The results remain very
similar indicating the existence of liquidity constraints, over and above any eﬀects due to
negative equity. Comparing the results from column 3 to those presented in columns 1&2
of Table 5, we see that the magnitude of the eﬀect of DSR shocks is greater for non-savers
than for the sample as a whole during crisis years (0.46 v 0.33), whereas this is not the
case for non-savers during non-crisis years (0.08 v 0.085). This provides further indication
of the role that liquidity constraints play in exacerbating the eﬀects of debt service ratio
shocks during periods of systemic crisis.
5 Robustness Checks
In this section we perform several checks to ensure that our ﬁndings are robust. One issue
we have with Table 5 is that we estimate separately on sub-samples during crisis (2009-
2013) and non-crisis years. However, in addition to the diﬀerence in coeﬃcients on ∆DSR,
the means for other variables during this period, such as the proportion of households in
negative equity, are likely to be quite diﬀerent. In order to capture the diﬀerent eﬀects
of ∆DSR on default during crisis and non-crisis times, in Table 8 we estimate the model
over the entire sample; this holds negative equity at means for the whole sample. This
helps us to get at whether the ﬁndings from Table 5 are driven solely by negative equity
concerns or also by liquidity/solvency concerns. The coeﬃcients in columns 1&2 of Table 8
are similar to those in Table 5. When estimating over the full sample we now no longer
ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of a one per cent decrease in ∆DSR, conditional on
∆DSR<0, on default in the non-crisis period.
Table 8: Robustness Check: The Sensitivity of Default to ∆DSR Shocks in Crisis
versus Non-Crisis Periods Estimated over Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆DSR>0 ∆DSR<0
Crisis Non-Crisis Crisis Non-Crisis
∆ DSR 0.274∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ -0.120 -0.0572
(0.0655) (0.0297) (0.0981) (0.0477)
Observations 4,330 4,330 4,330 4,330
Marginal eﬀects of a one per cent increase and decrease in ∆DSR on default estimated on the full sample. This is
comparable with Table 5 but estimated over the full sample rather than separately on sub-samples. Crisis period
covers 2009-2013. Standard errors reported in parentheses and signiﬁcance level displayed as ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Our primary focus in this paper is on the impact that aﬀordability or repayment
capacity shocks have on mortgage default. One limitation with the SILC data is that they
do not contain any information about the monetary value of any other loan commitments
the household may have. Rather, our debt service ratio measure only reﬂects the proportion
of net income that a household spends on mortgage instalments. In practice, it is likely
that any other loan commitments will also impact on whether they stay current on their
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mortgage payments. SILC does contain a binary indicator for whether a household has
fallen into default on their repayments of any consumer loans or hire purchase agreements
they may have i.e. any debt outside of their mortgage. This measure provides an indication
of broader ﬁnancial distress.
In Table 9 we re-estimate the speciﬁcation used in Table 5, this time adding the binary
indicator for whether a household is in default on any other loans. We use a one period lag
to avoid simultaneity concerns. The estimates reported in Table 9 are virtually identical
to those in Table 5. Controlling for whether a household was in other loan default at t−1,
or more generally broader ﬁnancial distress, does not reduce the impact of shocks to the
debt service ratio suﬀered between t− 1 and t on mortgage loan delinquency.
Table 9: Robustness Check: Accounting for Broader Financial Distress
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆DSR>0 ∆DSR<0
Crisis Non-Crisis Crisis Non-Crisis
∆ DSR 0.363∗∗∗ 0.0810∗∗∗ -0.0609 -0.157∗∗∗
(0.0882) (0.0278) (0.144) (0.0549)
Observations 1,389 2,941 1,389 2,941
Replication of Table 5 with the addition of a binary indicator for whether a household is in default on any other
loans (using a one period lag). Standard errors reported in parentheses and signiﬁcance level displayed as ∗ p <
0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
6 Conclusions
Since the onset of the global ﬁnancial crisis there has been renewed interest in research
examining the drivers of mortgage default. The majority of these studies focus on deter-
mining the relative importance of equity and aﬀordability shocks. A major challenge in
this literature is to adequately measure aﬀordability, or repayment capacity shocks. One
of the underlying reasons for this is that the majority of empirical papers are based on
loan-level data. These datasets contain a wealth of information on loan characteristics,
but lack up-to-date information on the current economic position of the household.
In this paper we use Irish household survey data to examine the importance of aﬀord-
ability or repayment capacity shocks as a driver of mortgage delinquency. Utilising infor-
mation on current household income, in addition to the employment and health status of
all household members, provides us with a more precise measure of household repayment
capacity, the debt service ratio, with which to examine the impact of aﬀordability shocks on
transitions into mortgage default. We estimate a discrete-time logit survival model which
directly links both changes in, and the level of, the debt service ratio to mortgage default.
We ﬁnd that shocks to the debt service ratio are a clear driver of mortgage delinquency.
We then allow an interaction eﬀect between the level of indebtedness as well as the
size of the shock to identify how shock absorption depends on the starting point debt
burden. We show that a deterioration in the debt service ratio increases the likelihood of
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delinquency regardless of the initial debt burden, although the eﬀect is twice as large for
those with a higher initial debt burden.
Finally, we show that while households do suﬀer from deteriorations in their debt servic-
ing capacity during both crisis and non-crisis times, the sensitivity of mortgage delinquency
to a rise in ∆DSR is greater during periods of systemic crisis relative to more macroeco-
nomically stable, non-crisis times. Examining potential channels for why this relationship
may vary over time reveals that it is due to the combination of DSR shocks with both neg-
ative equity, i.e. the double trigger, and with liquidity constraints which leave households
with insuﬃcient buﬀers with which to withstand aﬀordability shocks during a systemic
crisis. These ﬁndings highlight the importance of examining how parameters vary over
time. The eﬀects of repayment capacity shocks vary according to the broader economic
situation and we therefore need to take this into account when examining the drivers of
mortgage loan delinquency.
Our ﬁndings have important implications for ﬁnancial stability policy, bank stress test-
ing and the link between macroeconomic developments and the ﬁnancial sector. First,
we clearly ﬁnd that shocks to repayment capacity are critical for determining the level
of mortgage default. This ﬁnding would suggest that targeted borrower-based macropru-
dential instruments which limit the repayment capacity (such as debt-service to income
limits or loan-to-income restrictions) should play a critical role in building up buﬀers for
borrowers. Second, for bank stress testing purposes, models which determine the income
channel solely with aggregate unemployment indicators may underestimate the role of in-
come shocks in determining default. Consideration to expanding the scope of models in this
context would be useful. Finally, the interaction between negative equity, liquidity con-
straints and aﬀordability shocks during crisis periods highlights the feedback loops that
can develop during crisis periods. Our research would further support moves to ensure
both equity and aﬀordability buﬀers are built into macro-ﬁnancial stability policy.
Appendix
Table 10: Summary Statistics for Crisis versus Non-Crisis Periods
(1) (2)
Crisis Non-Crisis
Default 0.062 0.023
DSR 0.181 0.179
∆DSR -0.001 -0.004
HH member health shock 0.099 0.102
Rise in no. Unemployed in HH 0.066 0.034
CLTV 0.595 0.47
∆CLTV 0.048 -0.059
Negative Equity 0.192 0.089
Real Disposable Income (e) 61067.31 62873.13
Observations 1,389 2,941
Crisis period covers 2009-2013.
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Table 11: Logit Coeﬃcient on ∆DSR when ∆DSR is Positive and Negative
(1)
∆DSR if ∆DSR<0 -7.290
(6.450)
∆DSR if ∆DSR>0 6.248∗∗∗
(1.768)
Observations 4,330
Logit coeﬃcients on ∆DSR when ∆DSR>0 and ∆DSR<0 for the model estimated in Table 3.
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